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(i) 
The widely recognized externalities associated with livestock disease control have prompted 
countries throughout the world to invest in centralized control schemes designed to lower 
disease prevalence.  As disease levels drop and fiscal deficits climb, however, many 
governments are beginning to reconsider the design and delivery of their animal health services 
(Umali, et al., 1994).  The Animal Health Board in New Zealand, for example, is concerned 
that the regulatory policies implemented to encourage participation in the national bovine 
tuberculosis control scheme have distorted market signals and removed some of the private 
incentive to control disease.  Consistent with the ongoing shift to a more market-oriented 
economy, the Animal Health Board is attempting to identify and implement policies which 
encourage producer participation, yet convey more accurately the cost of disease (AHB, 1995).   
 
The success of the Animal Health Board’s efforts to motivate cost effective disease control 
depends critically on whether their new policies generate consistent rather than opposing 
incentives for individual livestock producers to control disease.  Much of the previous 
literature on animal health economics, however, consists of ex post evaluations of national 
control schemes which offer limited insight as to the potential behavioural responses of 
producers who raise livestock primarily for economic profit (Dietrich, et al., 1987; Ebel, et al., 
1992; Liu, 1979).  This paper utilizes recent advances in the dynamic bioeconomic literature to 
develop a behavioral model of livestock disease control.  The model is estimated and solved 
for a region in New Zealand where efforts to control bovine tuberculosis have been 
complicated by the existence of an effective wildlife reservoir for disease.  The model is 
unique in its integration of disease dynamics, inter-species interaction, control-induced 
migration, and individual optimizing behaviour into one, unifying optimal control model. 
 
General results from the theoretical model suggest that individual profit maximizing producers 
are not likely to eradicate disease from their herds due to the sharply increasing marginal cost 
of control as prevalence and vector density decline.  Policies which encourage higher levels of 
disease control may be necessary, therefore, to achieve prevalence levels which meet stringent 
human health and international trade standards.  Estimation and calibration of the theoretical 
model using bioeconomic data collected from a tuberculosis endemic region in New Zealand 
allows us to examine the potential impact of several proposed policy changes within the 
context of a specific empirical application.  Numerical results, validated with actual whole herd 
testing histories, suggest that compensation payments for test positive cattle are inflating the  
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implicit value of infected stock and reducing private incentive to control disease.  When annual 
testing is enforced by regulation, the introduction of a ‘user pays’ system for diagnostic testing 
simply transfers the cost of control to those who use the services.  It should be noted, however, 
that subsidized testing provides producers with a powerful incentive to comply with program 
objectives.  The success of policies which focus on controlling the wildlife reservoir for disease 
depends critically on whether the pest population recovers after control operations, as well as 
the probability of disease transmission between and among species. 
 
 
1. Empirical Problem 
 
This paper was motivated by the need to develop a more thorough understanding of the 
complex biological and economic dynamics which influence the spread and maintenance of 
bovine tuberculosis in New Zealand.  Although centralised control efforts have dramatically 
reduced the apparent prevalence of Tb in New Zealand over the past fifty years, recent control 
efforts have been compromised by the existence of a persistent wildlife reservoir of disease.  
Epidemiological research suggests that the Australian brushtailed possum is serving as the 
primary non-cattle source of infection.  Effective disease control therefore requires the 
combined efforts of ecologists as well as veterinarians, epidemiologists and economists.  The 
model developed below seeks to integrate the biological dynamics of pest and disease control 
into an economic framework which captures the behavioural responses of individual producers 
making economic decisions in a constrained environment. 
 
Currently used control measures for bovine Tb in New Zealand include diagnostic testing and 
subsequent slaughter of test positive cattle, the controlled movement of cattle from infected 
herds, slaughterhouse surveillance, and possum control operations.  In order to encourage 
participation in the test and slaughter program, policies such as subsidized testing and 
compensation for reactor cattle have been introduced.  Animals are tested each year and 
positive reactors are slaughtered.  Producers receive a subsidized price for test positive 
animals, which has recently been reduced from 85 to 65% of fair market value.  An additional 
check for tuberculous cattle is conducted at the slaughterhouse.  Lesioned carcasses are traced 
back to the farm of origin, where producers receive a salvage price determined by the market 
for cattle by-products.  Subsidies have also been received in the form of possum control 
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 operations, which are funded from a combination of government, industry, and individual 
landowner sources.  
 
The Animal Health Board is concerned that the current mix of policies is distorting market 
signals and sheltering producers from the true cost of disease.  As a consequence, the Board is 
considering a number of policy changes which will introduce a more market-oriented approach 
to disease control.  Discussion has focused on reducing compensation payments and 
introducing a ‘user pays’ system for testing.  Funding for possum control operations will be 
sought from those who contribute to the possum problem , as well as those who benefit from 
possum control.  Government monies will therefore continue to be used to fund operations on 
Crown land. 
 
The bioeconomic model presented in the next section was developed to gain insight into the 
economic trade-offs associated with various policy options, and to determine whether proposed 
changes are consistent with individual producer behaviour. The dynamics of the cattle herd and 
the possum populations which constrain the optimal control model are depicted in Figure 1.  
Susceptible cattle become infected with tuberculosis following effective contact with infected 
herdmates or possums.  Disease incidence therefore depends primarily upon the number of 
cattle in each disease state, the size of the wildlife reservoir, a set of epidemiological rate 
parameters, and the level of testing and marketing activity in each period.  Because intra-
uterine transmission of bovine tuberculosis is extremely uncommon, both classes of cattle are 
assumed to contribute to the biological growth of the susceptible herd.  The model also 
incorporates migratory pressure from a relatively densely populated uncontrolled habitat after 
control operations have reduced possum numbers near the cattle herd.  In the absence of 
control, the change in the possum populations is determined by the biological growth rate and 
the migratory flux between controlled and uncontrolled habitats.  Possums in the vicinity of a 
cattle operation can be further reduced by harvesting. 
 
 
2. Model Structure 
 
The optimal control model contains four state and three control variables.  The two state 
variables for cattle comprise susceptible (St) and infectious (It) stock, and the state variables 
for the wildlife reservoir include an ‘in contact’ population that may transmit disease to cattle  
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(P1t) and a neighbouring population in an uncontrolled habitat (P2t).  According to Equation 1, 
the cattle producer’s objective is to select a marketing (Mt) and testing (Tt) strategy for cattle, 
and a harvest scheme for the wildlife population (Ht) that maximizes discounted net revenue 
from the sale of cattle. 
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Cattle producers are assumed to be operating in a perfectly competitive environment, facing 
price p for non-infected cattle.  The parameter l represents a levy on all cattle slaughtered, 
which provides funding for the centralized disease control scheme.  The control variable for 
marketing is expressed in percentage terms, so the gross revenue from marketing healthy cattle 
is (p - l)MtSt. 
 
Because producers cannot distinguish between healthy and infectious animals by casual 
observation, the marketing activity reduces both categories of cattle indiscriminately.  All 
infectious stock sent to market will, however, be detected through routine slaughterhouse 
surveillance.  Producers may receive a small percentage of market value () for infected 
animals if all or part of the carcass can be salvaged for manufacturing purposes.  One of the 
direct costs associated with disease, therefore, is the reduction in carcass value of infected 
cattle. 
 
Testing is hypothesized to occur after the marketing activity has taken place, leaving a 
population of (1 - Mt)(St + It) individuals to test.  Cattle that test positive are removed from the 
herd and slaughtered.  Compensation is paid for all test positive animals as a percentage of 
market price, which is represented in the model by the parameters i.  The average annual cost 
per head of producing cattle (1) is assumed to be independent of disease status.  The average 
cost of testing cattle is represented by the parameter 2.  
 
The cost of harvesting possums which serve as vectors for disease is represented in Equation 1 
by PC(Ht,P1t).  Harvest costs can be expected to increase with harvest activity (Ht) and 
decrease with possum density (P1t).  The cost function for the empirical application was  
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estimated with data from twenty ground control operations which had been performed in a 
variety of habitat sites throughout New Zealand. 
 
Equations 2 and 3 describe the net rate of change in the population densities of healthy and 
infectious cattle through time: 
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Because supplementary feeding is uncommon in New Zealand, the beef cattle production 
process is heavily reliant upon the capacity of the pasture to support stock.  A modified logistic 
equation was therefore used to model the biological growth of the cattle herd, where a reflects 
the fecundity of the herd and Kc represents the carrying capacity of the pasture for cattle. 
 
Infected animals are the principal source of tuberculosis for susceptible cattle, who may 
become infected by either ingesting or inhaling live bacteria (Blood and Radostits, 1989). 
Following the methodology suggested by Anderson and May (Anderson and May, 1979a, 
Anderson and May, 1979b), the rate at which cattle become infected is proportional to the 
number of encounters between susceptible cattle and either infectious cattle or the wildlife 
reservoir.  The constants of proportionality (i) are comprised of two components:  the 
probability of close contact between an infectious and a susceptible individual, and the 
probability that transmission will occur as a result of the contact (Nokes and Andersen, 1988). 
To reflect the strong empirical relationship between possum abundance and disease prevalence 
in cattle (Livingstone, 1991), the transmission of tuberculosis between species is assumed to be 
proportional to the density of the controlled possum population.  Prior epidemiological 
modelling of Tb in possum populations suggests that eradication of the disease in possums may 
be possible if possum density is maintained below a particular threshold level (Barlow, 1991a; 
Barlow, 1991b).  The threshold concept is characteristic of this class of models, which require 
that the generation of secondary cases must be sufficient to maintain infection within the 
population of interest.  The disease threshold for the possum population is incorporated into the 
current model by making transmission proportional to (P1t - Z), where Z represents 
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 the critical density of possums below which the disease will not persist in the population.  It is 
therefore possible, although it may not be economically optimal, to remove possums as a 
source of disease by holding them at their disease threshold. 
 
While it is assumed that producers cannot distinguish between healthy and infectious animals 
by casual observation, disease status can be estimated with the aid of a diagnostic test.  The 
parameter 1 defines the proportion of healthy cattle that are removed from the herd because of 
test positive status.  The number of false positive reactors varies inversely with the level of the 
test specificity (specificity = 1 - 1), which reflects the ability of the test to correctly detect 
non-diseased animals.  Similarly, 2 determines the proportion of infected animals that are 
removed from the herd during testing.  This proportion depends directly on the test sensitivity, 
which reflects the ability of the test to detect infected animals.  The model implicitly specifies a 
maximum number of one whole-herd test per year.  Although the overall sensitivity and 
specificity of a testing program can be improved by testing more frequently throughout the 
year, multiple testing is extremely uncommon in endemic areas.  Finally, a low rate of natural 
mortality (b) slows the growth of both cattle populations. 
 
Equations 4 and 5 represent the equations of motion for possums in the controlled and 
uncontrolled habitats, respectively.  Following Clout and Barlow (Clout and Barlow, 1982), the 
biological growth of the possum populations is described by a simple logistic equation.   
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In spatially complex ecological systems, harvesting efforts may be compromised by 
immigration from neighbouring habitats (Hickling, 1993). This migratory pressure is captured 
by a flux term which dictates the rate of movement between controlled and uncontrolled 
habitats.  The flux term is based upon the ecological modelling work of Hestbeck (1988) and 
Steneth (1988), who have observed that animals will emigrate from relatively densely 
populated habitats if the opportunity arrises.  Migration is therefore hypothesized to be density 
dependent, and will increase the speed at which managed populations recover from control 
activities.  The parameter D essentially represents the maximum number of possums that will 
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 recolonize a neighbouring area that has been completely cleared of possums.  A similar 
specification has been applied to the optimal control of beavers in North America (Huffaker, et 
al., 1992) and the management of possum populations in New Zealand (Barlow, 1993). 
 
The producer’s economic problem is therefore to maximize Equation 1, subject to Equations 2 
- 5, which represent the biological equations of motion for this bioeconomic model.  Equations 
6 and 7 place additional restriction on the state and control space, respectively, and Equation 8 
specifies the initial conditions for the state variables. 
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3. General Implications of Optimizing Behaviour 
 
The current valued Hamiltonian for this problem is defined as follows: 
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The variables mi (i = 1,2,3,4) are costate variables and can be interpreted as the implicit value 
of the stock with which they are associated (Chiang, 1992).   
 
The Hamiltonian is linear in testing and marketing, and non-linear in wildlife harvest.  The 
optimal solution will therefore consist of some combination of singular and bang-bang controls 
for Tt and Mt, and an interior solution for Ht (unless the marginal cost of harvest outweighs the 
discounted benefits).  The first order conditions for this model consist of three algebraic 
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 expressions and eight differential equations that must be solved simultaneously for the optimal 
trajectories of the state, control and costate variables.  Consequently, the complexity of this 
empirical problem precludes a complete analytical solution.  The first order conditions for 
testing and harvesting do, however, offer some insight as to what motivates profit maximizing 
producers control disease. 
 
Diagnostic Testing.  The switching function for testing is derived by differentiating the current 
valued Hamiltonian with respect to the testing variable: 
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The resulting expression is used to synthesize the following optimal testing sequence: 
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which requires that the testing activity be set at one of its extreme values when the switching 
function is nonzero.  For example, testing will cease when the implicit value of an infected 
individual is greater than the net revenue from testing:  
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implies that: 
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The LHS of Equation 13 represents the value of an infectious animal as a productive asset of 
(healthy) calves.  The first term on the RHS represents the gross revenue obtained for each  
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correctly identified diseased animal.  This is followed by a term representing the gross value of 
healthy animals slaughtered due to false positive status after a Tb test (also expressed per 
diseased animal identified).  The gross value of false positive animals slaughtered is their 
salvage value minus their shadow value as a producing unit.  The final term on the RHS 
represents the direct cost of testing.  Note that various components of the disease control 
program affect this private decision function in different ways.  For example, by subsidizing 
testing costs (2), regulators encourage testing.  On the other hand, the levy (l) reduces the 
implicit value of a slaughtered beast, and therefore reduces the incentive to test.  Similarly, 
subsidized compensation for test positive animals (1, 2) increases the incentive to test, as 
would adopting a testing procedure with a higher test sensitivity (2) or specificity (1-1).  
Equation 13 also illustrates clearly why individual producers cannot generally be expected to 
voluntarily follow a testing program which completely eradicates disease.  As the ratio of 
healthy to infected animals rises, the costs of identifying the last diseased animals rise, making 
it uneconomic to test and remove animals from the herd. 
 
Vector control.  In addition to testing and removing infected animals, producers have a private 
incentive to reduce the disease reservoir, or local possum population in this example.  
Assuming an interior control, profits from raising cattle will be maximized when the harvest 
rate for the wildlife vector population is adjusted each period so that marginal harvest costs are 
just balanced by the discounted marginal benefits of removing the potential source of disease.  
According to equation 14, the producer reduces the possum population in a manner which 
balances the marginal removal costs with the (negative) marginal benefit of the last unit left in 
the disease reservoir: 
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Estimation of a cost function for vector control in New Zealand suggests that control costs 
escalate as pest densities decline, implying that the marginal cost of harvest will increase as 
successful control efforts lower pest densities. 
 
The above analysis confirms conclusions drawn earlier (Morris and Blood, 1969; Rubenstein, 
1977; Stoneham and Johnston, 1986), that profit maximizing producers will control disease in 
the absence of regulation provided that the benefits of control outweigh the costs.  Private  
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benefits and costs can be influenced in important ways, however, by the mix and level of 
incentives associated with the Animal Health Board’s disease control program.  The complete 
elimination of disease is unlikely to be optimal for any particular individual due to the sharply 
increasing marginal costs associated with controlling disease and the wildlife reservoir at low 
levels of prevalence and density (respectively).  A collective approach may therefore be 
required to achieve eradication objectives that are more stringent than those that would be 
attained exclusively under private incentives.   
 
 
4. Results from the Empirical Model 
 
The control model was calibrated with parameter values estimated and/or derived to 
approximate current conditions in the Clarence/Waiau Tb endemic region in the South Island 
of New Zealand (See Table 1 for variable definitions and calibrated values).  Following 
Standiford and Howitt (1992), the model was specified as a non-linear programming problem 
and solved numerically on GAMS.  Results from the base run of the empirical model are 
displayed in the first column of Table 2.  Assuming an enforced annual testing regime is in 
place, a steady state cattle herd of 231 is reached within the first five time periods.  The 
marketing activity follows a singular path of 36%, or 83 head of cattle sold each time period.  
Annual revenue is maintained at $27.44/ha, or $44,672.32 for the cattle enterprise.  When the 
initial values of the parameters are set substantially above or below this level, the steady state 
is reached as quickly as possible by setting the marketing variable at one of its extreme values.  
This "most rapid approach" path is characteristic of linear control problems. 
 
The above values compare vary favourably to statistics available from the New Zealand Sheep 
and Beef Farm Survey.  At the beginning of the 1992/93 financial year Class II farms reported 
an average herd size of 233 beef animals.  Throughout the year 85 animals were marketed, 
which represents 36.5% of the opening herd.  Net revenue per hectare for the cattle enterprise 
was $27.01. 
 
Numerical results suggest that disease will persist in the herd at a real prevalence of 1.11%, 
and that seventy-five percent of the reactor cattle will be false positives.  In an effort to validate 
the model, this output was compared to actual herd histories for a small number of beef 
breeding herds in the Clarence/Waiau endemic region that have been experiencing trouble 
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 with persistent levels of Tb.  While the reactor rate predicted by the model (1.7%) is within the 
observed range of the averages calculated from the sample data (0.66% -- 1.8%), the model 
over estimated the number of false positive reactors. 
 
Post mortem analysis of reactor carcasses from the Clarence/Waiau endemic region reveals that 
approximately half of the cattle destroyed for test positive status in 1993/94 exhibited visible 
tuberculous lesions at slaughter, suggesting that at least half of the reactor cattle were actually 
tuberculous.  The proportion of false positive reactors is a function of the true prevalence of 
disease in the herd as well as the specificity and sensitivity of the tuberculosis test.  In 
particular, small increases in the specificity of the test (decreases in 1) will result in relatively 
large decreases in the absolute number of false positives.  Subsequent discussions with animal 
health officials suggest that MAF veterinarians are achieving higher levels of both sensitivity 
and specificity than those suggested by the field trial upon which the model parameter 
estimates were based, which could account for the discrepancy between model output and the 
empirical data. 
 
The marginal values on a number of the constraints provide interesting economic information 
on this complex system.  The shadow value for testing is small in magnitude, but negative in 
all time periods.  The implication is that enforced testing on an annual basis imposes an 
economic cost on the system despite the fact that the veterinary charges are not borne directly 
by the producer.  Under the assumed values of the parameters, therefore, profit maximizing 
producers cannot be expected to test in every period.  Increasing the initial number of infected 
animals results in a positive marginal value for the testing constraint early in the first few 
years, suggesting that the optimal strategy is to test early in the time horizon. 
 
The marginal values on the equations of motion represent the costate variables for each 
respective state variable.  Of particular interest is the costate variable for infected cattle.  
Although infected cattle have a smaller implicit value than healthy cattle, the fact that the 
costate variable is positive implies that infected cattle are a productive economic asset despite 
their contribution to the disease process.  Policy analysis in the following sections indicates 
that reactor compensation has a profound effect on the implicit value of infectious cattle. 
 
The model predicts that possum harvesting activities will be maintained at a low level of 
approximately 2% of the farm possum population, which encourages a small amount of  
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migration from the adjacent habitat.  Although the costate variable for possums indicates that 
they have negative economic value, the costs of harvesting under the assumed wage precludes 
a more rigorous level of control. 
 
 
5. General Policy Implications 
 
The Animal Health Board is concerned that national tuberculosis control policies such as 
reactor compensation and subsidized possum control have distorted market signals and 
deterred individual producers from more active participation in the disease control process.  As 
a consequence, the Board is seeking to identify policies which achieve lower levels of disease 
by encouraging individual producers to take more responsibility for the level of disease within 
their herds (AHB, 1995).  Numerical simulation with the model estimated above provides a 
means by which the relationship between potential policies and the resulting level of disease 
can be explored before costly policies are instituted. 
 
5.1 Eliminating Compensation Payments 
 
One of the policies under investigation by the Animal Health Board is payment for reactor 
cattle.  Compensation payments will be reduced under the latest National Tb Strategy, and 
closely reviewed in the years that follow.  For simulation purposes, a ‘no compensation’ policy 
was approximated by increasing 1 and decreasing 2 (second column of Table 2).  Results 
suggest that producers would achieve a slightly lower prevalence without compensation by 
increasing the possum harvest rate and maintaining a smaller herd to reduce both between and 
within species transmission.  A similar level of sales is obtained by marketing a larger 
percentage of a smaller herd.  Annual revenue falls by $0.11 per hectare, or approximately 
$179.08. 
 
One variable of particular interest is the value of the costate variable on infected cattle.  In the 
ceteris paribus absence of compensation, the implicit value of an infected animal becomes 
negative.  While it is still not optimal to test every period (the marginal value on the testing 
constraint becomes negative after the fifth period) the elimination of compensation implies a 
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 very different value for infected stock.  As a consequence, producers take a more active role in 
controlling the spread of disease within their herds.  
Compensation was initiated in part to encourage compliance with Tb control measures (AHB, 
1995).  There is a perception, therefore, that the elimination of compensation payments may 
prompt non-compliant behaviour.  Numerical work with the empirical model indicates that 
when testing is a choice variable, the elimination of compensation leads to a decrease in testing 
activity, which results in a higher level of prevalence on average.  These results support the 
Board’s concern, and provide a prime example of how the success of one policy (elimination of 
compensation) depends critically on the existence of another (enforced testing). 
 
5.2 User Pays for Tuberculosis Testing 
 
In an effort to make the costs of tuberculosis control more transparent, the Board considered 
several proposals which would have required producers to pay directly for tuberculosis testing.  
The latest National Tb Strategy indicates that whole herd testing will continue to be funded 
from the slaughter levy, but that producers are expected to pay for ancillary testing and tests 
associated with movement control.  As with reactor compensation, the Board will monitor the 
testing policy, and propose changes if they feel that the goals of the strategy are being 
compromized.  A ‘user-pays’ system for whole herd testing was simulated by increasing the 
cost of the test, but continuing to force the producer to test annually.  When annual Tb testing 
is enforced by regulation, increasing the cost of testing serves primarily to reduce annual 
revenue for producers of breeding and/or store stock in endemic regions (Policy 3 in Table 2).  
The very slight reduction in prevalence results from the maintenance of a smaller steady-state 
herd.  Producers who fatten store stock for slaughter would clearly be the major beneficiaries 
of a policy which increase the variable cost of testing as they maintain proportionately fewer 
breeding animals which require regular testing.   
 
Once again it is important to note that the results of this analysis rely on the fact that annual 
tuberculosis testing is enforced by regulation.  The variable cost of testing is an important 
component of the switching function for testing, and can be expected to influence the annual 
decision to test.  Numerical analysis confirms this expectation, by revealing a strong (direct) 
relationship between the cost of testing and the resulting level of disease when producers 
choose the level of testing activity that maximizes profit. 
 13
  
5.3 The Wildlife Reservoir 
 
Given 1) the base values for the parameters, 2) the ‘closed herd’ assumption, and 3) an 
enforced testing regime, the key force driving disease dynamics in the system is reinfection 
from the wildlife reservoir.  The following subsections examine the implications of an 
exogenous reduction in the population of possums that have direct access to cattle.  The results 
of the analysis are shown to depend critically on 1) whether and how quickly the possum 
population manages to recover from control operations, and 2) whether producers are expected 
to fund continuing maintenance control directly.  A subsidy on the direct cost of possum 
control is considered in the final sub-section. 
 
Elimination of the Wildlife Reservoir.  The successful elimination of the wildlife reservoir was 
simulated by setting 2 equal to zero.  Results indicate that if possum are eliminated as a 
source of tuberculosis, annual testing will eventually drive disease from the cattle population.  
Steady state values for the state and control variables (Policy 4 in Table 2) indicate that in the 
absence of tuberculosis, producers would market more animals from a larger herd, thereby 
increasing their annual revenue by over $520 per year. 
 
Recovery of the Possum Population.  While the results reported above imply that eliminating 
the wildlife reservoir will lead to the eventual eradication of disease in cattle, concern has been 
raised about the implications of population recovery through reproduction and immigration of 
possums from neighbouring (uncontrolled) habitats.  Prior modelling work suggests that 
immigration may pose a particular threat to producers on small blocks of land when possum 
control is periodic (Hickling, 1993).  To develop an appreciation for the possible effects of 
population recovery, periodic possum control operations were simulated by exogenously 
reducing the possum population in the controlled habitat every 5 years.  
 
Under the assumed values of the parameters, the possum population recovers from control 
operations quite rapidly through reproduction and immigration from the uncontrolled habitat.  
Disease consequently persists in the cattle herd at an average level of approximately 0.56%.  
Reducing the dispersion parameter slows the rate of recolonization, but disease remains in the 
herd at low levels even in the absence of immigration.  The clear implication of these  
 14
simulation results is that possum control operations must be persistent and well monitored if 
they are to be effective as a disease eradication strategy. 
 
Implications of a Single Exogenous Reduction in the Possum Population.  The AHB has 
signalled a commitment to a policy that would involve a one-time subsidized reduction of the 
possum population, provided landowners actively maintain these populations at low levels.  
The Board envisions that landowners will fund these operations either collectively, or by direct 
contribution (AHB, 1995).  While it may be tempting to assume that producers acting 
independently will maintain a control program initially undertaken on their behalf, economic 
theory tells us that such sunk costs are irrelevant for current (and future) decisions.  
Exogenously funded control efforts do not change the basic incentive structure facing an 
individual producer. Paradoxically, reductions in the possum population serve only to make 
individually funded control more expensive, as control costs are inversely related to population 
density.  Producers should therefore not be expected to maintain possum numbers at low levels 
if such control activities were not optimal prior to any activity undertaken by the AHB.  This 
phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 2, which compares the timepath for prevalence 
following a single exogenously funded control operation to the disease level in the base run. 
 
In the simulated 'one-off' control scenario prevalence is initially driven below the base level, 
but it climbs to the steady-state level reached in the base run relatively rapidly.  This is hardly 
surprising, as none of the parameters which dictate the steady state values for the state and 
control variables have changed.  Removal of the dispersion flux terms does not change the 
qualitative results of the model, it simply takes longer for the controlled population to recover.  
In either case the producer-funded harvest rate starts at a lower level than without the one-off 
policy, and then increases smoothly to the original steady state level. 
 
Subsidizing Possum Harvest.  Results from the analytical model indicate that when making 
possum control decisions, producers balance the (private) marginal cost of harvest against the 
benefits of a reduction in the level of prevalence.  Policies aimed at changing the marginal cost 
of harvest can therefore be expected to have a much more profound effect on producer 
behaviour than policies which exogenously reduce the possum population.  A subsidy on the 
cost of possum control was simulated by reducing the cost per day of harvesting possums.  
Predicably, there is a direct relationship between the level of subsidy and the resulting amount 
of effort directed towards possum harvest.  More detailed numerical work, however, indicates  
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that the responsiveness of prevalence to a reduction in the cost of harvesting possums depends 
critically on the level of transmission between possums and cattle, as well as the range of 
subsidy under consideration. 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the response of prevalence is much more dramatic when the 
probability of effective contact between possums and cattle is high.  This makes intuitive sense 
since the implicit cost associated with not harvesting possums is much higher when the 
probability of disease transmission is high.  This is reflected in the empirical model by a much 
more negative marginal value on both of the possum populations at relatively high values of 
2.   Prevalence is also revealed to be relatively unresponsive to decreases in the cost of 
harvesting at low levels of subsidy, particularly when the probability of disease transmission 
between possums and cattle is low.  In general, the reduction in the possum population that 
follows a subsidy on possum harvest allows the producer to maintain a slightly larger herd, 
from which a greater number of cattle are marketed each year.  As expected, net revenue from 
the cattle operation increases as prevalence declines.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper was motivated by the ongoing debate regarding the role of the public sector in 
livestock disease control, and the empirical difficulties associated with controlling a disease for 
which an effective wildlife reservoir exists.  The optimal control methodology developed in 
this paper embeds models of disease transmission and species interaction into a dynamic 
optimization framework, incorporating non-linear relationships between the four state and 
three control variables.  First order conditions from the theoretical model confirm results from 
earlier studies:  individual profit maximizing producers are not likely to eradicate disease from 
their herds due to the increasing marginal cost of control as prevalence declines. 
 
Results from the empirical model confirm that while the current mix of policies to control 
bovine tuberculosis in New Zealand is achieving lower levels of prevalence than would prevail 
in the absence of a strategy, they also appear to be distorting market signals and removing 
some of the individual incentive to control disease.  The elimination of compensation payments 
for reactor cattle provides a more accurate indication of the value of infected stock, and 
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 encourages producers reduce prevalence by increasing their possum harvest activities and 
maintaining slightly smaller herds.  In a regulated environment the introduction of a ‘user pays’ 
philosophy for testing simply transfers the cost of testing cattle to those who use the service 
most heavily.  It should be noted, however, that compensation payments and subsidized testing 
both serve to encourage testing activity.  The elimination of these policies may therefore 
increase the risk of non-compliance.  Policies aimed directly at suppressing the wildlife 
reservoir appear to be the most effective at reducing prevalence in bovine Tb endemic areas.  
Given the tendency for possum populations to recover through a combination of migration and 
reproduction, however, control efforts must be well monitored and diligently maintained. 
 
The theoretical framework and the empirical bioeconomic model developed in this paper show 
considerable promise for the analysis of a wide range of disease control issues.  While 
countries throughout the world are reconsidering the role of the public sector in the delivery of 
animal health services, externalities associated with the control of infectious diseases suggest 
that private solutions to disease control problems will not be socially optimal.  This model 
provides a means by which important trade-offs among disease control inputs can be analysed, 
and the effects of proposed policies can be examined in a relatively inexpensive ex ante 
manner. 
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Figure 1:  Schematic Diagram of Bioeconomic System 
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Figure 2:  Trajectory for Disease:  One-off Control versus Base Run 
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Figure 3:  Disease Response to Harvest Subsidy at Various Levels of 
Possum-Cattle Transmission 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Parameter Values 
 
Variable Definition Base 
St Density of susceptible cattle (state variable) hd/ha 
It Density of infected cattle (state variable) hd/hd 
P1t Density of farm possums (state variable) hd/ha 
P2t Density of forest possums (state variable) hd/ha 
Mt Marketing activity (control variable) % 
Tt Tuberculosis testing effort (control variable) % 
Ht Harvest rate for possums (control variable)  hd/ha 
 Annual discount ratea 7.05% 
p Average price of cattle ($/hd)b $570 
lt Slaughter levy ($/hd)c $8.70 
1 Compensation for non-leisioned test positive cattlec 85% 
2 Compensation for leisioned test positive cattlec 85% 
 Market value salvaged from infected cattled 35% 
1 Variable costs of maintaining herd ($/hd)e $15 
2 Cost of testing cattle ($/hd)f $1.50 
PC(Ht,P1t
)
Cost function for possum harvestg w H
P
t
t645 1
2
.




 
w Cost of time spent possum hunting ($/day)h $136 
a Maximum rate of growth for cattle herd (-t)i 67% 
Kc Carrying capacity of pasture -- cattle (hd/ha)i 0.35 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Variable Definition Base 
b Mortality for cattle (-t)i 2% 
rP1 Intrinsic growth rate for farm possums (-t)j 30% 
KP1 Carrying capacity for farm possumsj 3  
rP2 Intrinsic growth rate for forest possumsj 20% 
KP2 Carrying capacity for forest possumsj 2 
D Dispersion parameter (hd/ha/yr)k 1 
Z Possum disease threshold (hd/ha)l 1.4 
1 Cattle-cattle disease transmission coefficientm 3 
2 Possum-cattle disease transmission coefficientn 0.003 
1 (1 - specificity of the tuberculosis test) = % Falseo 2% 
2 Sensitivity of the tuberculosis test = % True  66% 
 
 
a  Seasonal loan rate for farm related business expenditure, secured with farm property and/or 
stock (Burt and Fleming, 1994). 
 
b  Weighted average of farm-gate prices for all cattle sold from Class II farms (NZMWB, 
(various issues)). 
 
c  National Tb Strategy (AHB, 1995). 
 
d  Scott and Forbes (1988) estimated that producers receive thirty-five percent of full market 
value for infected animals. 
 
e  Average direct expenditure per head taken from the Financial Budget Manual (Burt and 
Fleming, 1994). 
 
f  Average mustering and handling costs for typical North Island Hill Country sheep and beef 
farm stocking 340 head of cattle (Nimmo-Bell, 1994).  Should be considered ‘lower bound’. 
Does not include veterinary charges, which are currently covered by the National Tb 
Control Scheme. 
 
g  The cost function for possum control was derived by solving the following economic 
problem:    The harvest function was estimated 
econometrically using data collected from 20 ground control operations throughout New 
Zealand.  Parameter values of q = 2.54, 
Et
t t tTC E wE subject to H qE Pmin ( ) , .     1 21
1 = 0.56 and 2 = 0.96 were all significant at the  
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10% level or above.  A test of the joint hypothesis that 1 = 0.5 and 2 = 1.0 could not be 
rejected at a 0.5% level of significance, yielding the parameter values listed above. 
 
h  Represents the average cost per day for contract hunters for 9 ground-based operations on 
blocks of less than 1,000 ha (Warburton and Cullen, 1993).  Does not include the cost of 
planning the operations or their subsequent monitoring. 
 
I  Estimated from data in the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey (NZMWB, (various 
issues)). 
 
j  Estimates of r for possums range from 0.2 to 0.59, while values for K range from fewer than 
1 to over 25 (Batcheler and Cowan, 1988). Values chosen for rP1 and KP1 appear to be most 
representative of farmland/scrub habitat.  Possum populations in forest habitats, by contrast, 
grow at a slower intrinsic rate to a smaller carrying capacity, suggesting lower parameter 
values for the uncontrolled parcel. 
 
k  Data for the estimation of this parameter was taken from a number of ecological studies  
(Clout and Efford, 1984); Green and Coleman [reported in Batchelor and Cowan, 1988], 
(Barlow, 1993) which imply that under a variety of habitat conditions, when the population 
of possums in a controlled area has been substantially reduced, possums from surrounding 
undisturbed habitats will immigrate at the rate of 1 hd/ha. 
 
l  Following current control practices, which are based on Barlow's modelling work (1991a, 
1991b), Z is set to a number representing 40% of the possum carrying capacity. 
m  Based on past attempts to estimate a coefficient for the transmission of tuberculosis between 
infectious and susceptible cattle in New Zealand, which suggest a range for i of 2.77 to 
6.12 (Kean, 1993). 
 
n  Data limitations and cost constraints have precluded precise estimates of the probability of 
transmission between possums and cattle. 
 
o  A field trial of the tuberculosis test under New Zealand field conditions suggests a 
specificity and sensitivity of 98% and 66%, respectively (Ryan, et al., 1991). 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Steadystate Values for Key Variables:  Policy Analysis 
 
    Policy1    
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
2
 6 7 
Prevalence 1.11% 1.02% 1.10% 0% 0.57% 1.11% 1.0% 
Herdsize 231 229 228 233 232 231 231 
Sales 83 83 83 85 84 83 84 
Harvest Rate 2.16% 3.61% 2.16% -- 2.54% 2.16% 4.24% 
Density P1 (hd/ha) 2.84 2.73 2.84 -- 2.1 2.84 2.68 
Density P2 (hd/ha) 1.92 1.87 1.92 -- 1.54 1.92 1.85 
Costate for S $562 $566 $569 $565 $563 $562 $563 
Costate for I $202 -$52 $205 $187 $194 $202 $200 
Costate for P1 -$0.32 -$0.55 -$0.32 $0.00 -$0.51 -$0.32 -$0.32 
Costate for P2 -$0.21 -$0.37 -$0.21 $0.00 -$0.38 -$0.21 -$0.22 
Revenue ($/ha) $27.44 $27.33 $27.23 $27.76 $27.59 $27.44 $27.46 
1 1) Base values for the parameters.  2) No compensation. 1 = 0.9, 2 = 0.9, l = $7.70.  3) User pays for testing.  2 = $5.00, l = $5.50.  4) Elimination 
of disease reservoir. 2 = 0.  5) Periodic possum control.  Exogenous harvest every 5 years. 6)  One exogenous possum control operation.  7) 50% 
Subsidy on cost of harvest; 
2 Results reported in terms of averages for t = 10 - 40.  
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